Abstract. This paper proposes two (ordinal and cardinal) generalizations of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) risk-dominance to multi-player, multi-action games. There are three reasons why generalized risk-dominance (GR-dominance) is interesting. Extending the logic of riskdominance, GR-dominant actions can be interpreted as best responses to conjectures that satisfy a certain type of symmetry. Second, in a local interaction game of Ellison (1993) , if an action is risk-dominant in individual binary interactions with neighbors, it is also GRdominant in the large game on a network. Finally, we show that GR-dominant actions are stochastically stable under a class of evolutionary dynamics. The last observation is a corollary to new abstract selection results that applies to a wide class of so-called asymmetric dynamics. In particular, I show that a (strictly) ordinal GR-dominant pro…le is (uniquely) stochastically stable under the approximate best-response dynamics of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) . A (strictly) cardinal GR-dominant equilibrium is (uniquely) stochastically stable under a class of payo¤-based dynamics that includes Blume (1993) . Among others, this leads to a generalization of a result from Ellison (2000) on the 1 2 -dominant evolutionary selection to all networks and the unique selection to all networks that satisfy a simple, su¢ cient condition.
Introduction
There is a large literature that is concerned with selecting a unique equilibrium in games with with multiple equilibria. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) proposed risk-dominance as an selection criterion that is appropriate for games with two players and two actions. It turned out soon that risk-dominance plays an important role in two di¤erent models of equilibrium selection: robustness to incomplete information (Carlsson and Damme (1993) and Kajii and Morris (1997) ) and evolutionary learning (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) ). The connection between the two models can be easily attributed to the relation between two equivalent statement of risk-dominance. In a two-action coordination game, the risk-dominant action is a best response to the conjecture that assigns equal probability to each of the opponent actions. Alternatively, consider a population game in which players are randomly and uniformly matched in pairs to play two-action coordination game. The risk-dominant action is a best response to any population pro…le in which each action is played by exactly half of the population.
This paper proposes two generalizations of risk-dominance from two-player to multi-player and multi-action games. The …rst generalization depends on the ordinal, and the second on the cardinal properties of the payo¤ function. We motivate the generalizations on two levels. First, we show that they preserve the logic of risk-dominance in richer environments. Second, we show that the generalizations are stochastically stable under a class of evolutionary dynamics. These results are corollaries to an abstract selection result about asymmetric dynamics.
1.1. Generalized risk-dominance. We present two versions, an ordinal and a cardinal, of a generalized risk-dominance (GR-dominance). Suppose that there are I 2 players, and each player i chooses an action x i 2 A i : Fix pro…le a = (a i ) 2 i A i : Say that two (pure strategy) pro…les ; 2 i A i are a-associated, if all players i who do not play a i in pro…le
; play a i in pro…le : for all i; either i = a i or i = a i . Say that pro…le a is ordinal GRdominant, if whenever action a i is not a best response against pro…le ; it is a best response against any a-associated pro…le :
For all a-associated pro…les and , for all players i;
(1.1) action a i is a best response to either or :
Let u i (x i ; ) be the payo¤ of player i when she plays x i and the other players follow pro…le :
The de…nition of ordinal GR dominance depends only on the best-response behavior of the payo¤ function. Say that pro…le a is cardinal GR dominant if the utility loss from playing a i rather than the best action x i 6 = a i to pro…le is not higher than the gain from playing a i rather than the best action x i 6 = a i to a-associated pro…le :
For all a-associated pro…les and , for all players i; (1.2) max x i 6 =a i u i (x i ; ) u i (a i ; ) u i (a i ; ) max
These de…nitions have appropriate strict versions. Any cardinal or ordinal GR dominant pro…le is a pure-strategy equilibrium. With two players and two actions, a pro…le is cardinal GR dominant if and only if it is risk-dominant. Because Harsanyi and Selten (1988) 's de…nition depends on cardinal properties of payo¤s, there is no immediate relation between risk-dominance and ordinal GR-dominance in twoplayer games. For multi-player games, Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995) de…ne a (p 1 ; :::; p I )-dominant equilibrium, in which the action of player i is the best response to any conjecture that assigns a probability of at least p i to the equilibrium action pro…le. We show in Section 4 that if there are only two actions for each player, then cardinal GR dominance implies 1 2 ; :::; 1 2 -dominance. There is no further logical relationship between GR dominance and 1 2 -dominance in general multi-player games. 1 1.2. Motivation. We argue that GR dominance extends the logic of risk-dominance to multi-player games. It is useful to distinguish among two statements of risk-dominance: belief-based and population-based.
2 According to the belief-based version, pro…le a = (a 1 ; a 2 ) in a two-player, two-action game is risk-dominant, if, for each player i; action a i is a best response to any conjecture that assigns at least 1 2 -probability to the opponent playing a i . 3 In coordination games, it is enough to require that a i is a best response to any conjecture that is symmetric with respect to (i.e., which assigns equal probability to) actions A i = fa i ; b i g.
Cardinal GR dominant actions are best responses to conjectures that satisfy an analogous type of symmetry in multi-player games. Suppose that each player chooses between two actions, A i = fa i ; b i g and that actions a i are complementary, i.e., if a i is a best response, it remains the best response when more players switch to a. For each pro…le , …nd the unique pro…le in which actions of all players are ‡ipped. One can think about as obtained from by relabeling all the actions as into bs and vice versa. Say that player i's conjecture about other players'behavior is symmetric with respect to labels, if the conjectured probability of pro…le is equal to the conjectured probability of pro…le for all : Players with symmetric conjectures are reluctant to assume that actions with di¤erent labels are treated di¤erently by other players. We show that a is cardinally GR dominant if and only if a is a best response of each player to any symmetric conjecture (Lemma 5).
Alternatively, consider the population-based interpretation of risk-dominance. Suppose each player is matched to play a two-player two-action interaction game with an opponent chosen randomly and uniformly from a large population (this is the model analyzed in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) ). Pro…le (a i ; a j ) is risk-dominant in the two-player interaction 1 In particular, there is no relationship between 1 2 ; :::; 1 2 -dominance and ordinal ‡ip-dominance. This is not surprising given the fact that the former is de…ned with respect to cardinal properties of the payo¤ function, and the latter is a purely ordinal concept.
2 I am grateful to the editior for this suggestion. 3 When there are two players, but more than two actions, the above de…nition has been introduced in Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995) as 1 2 -dominance. The following discussion applies unchanged if the interaction game has more than two actions. game between players i and j; if and only if action a i is a best response to any population pro…le in which a majority of players chooses a :
In more general games, players are not matched according to uniform distribution. For example, in a model of local interactions introduced by Ellison (1993) , there are I players located on a network. Player i's payo¤s are equal to the sum of payo¤s in the interactions with his neighbors,
where g ij 2 f0; 1g denotes the existence of a connection between players i and j and is a payo¤ function in the two-player interaction. (1.3) generalizes the global interaction model of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) where all players are connected, g ij = 1 for each i and j: Consider a network in Figure 1 . Player 1 has three neighbors: players 2; 5, and 8: Suppose that action a is best response in the two-player interaction if the opponent plays a with a probability at least ; b is a best response when the opponent plays a with a probability not more than : Then, there are pro…les where the majority of players play a; but a is not player i's best response: For example, if all players but player 2 and 5 play a; b is player 1's best response even though more than half of players play a: On the other hand, if all players ‡ip their actions from a to b and vice versa, then action a becomes player 1's best response. More generally, Lemmas 4 and 6 show that the pro…le of actions that are risk-dominant in the two-player interaction is (cardinal and ordinal) GR dominant in any multi-player game (1.3) on any network. The pro…les are strictly ordinal GR dominant, if the network satis…es a simple su¢ cient condition on the number of neighbors of each player and strictly cardinal dominant if the actions satisfy a version of strict risk-dominance in the two-player interaction.
4 4 One could work with an alternative extension of risk-dominance. Say that the pro…le of actions a is multi-player risk-dominant, if action a i is a best response against any pro…le of actions in which at least half of the players play a: This is a stronger de…nition than generalized risk-dominance. The example shows that 1.3. Stochastic stability. The main results of the paper extend and generalize various stochastic stability results that the evolutionary literature has traditionally associated with risk-dominance. We discuss these results as corollaries to an abstract selection result described in section 2. We identify a simple su¢ cient condition for stochastic stability, called asymmetry of dynamics. Asymmetry is a condition of its own interest, as it is likely to be satis…ed by other dynamics and other generalizations of risk-dominance. Theorem 1 shows that if the dynamics are asymmetric toward pro…le a then pro…le a is stochastically stable. Uniqueness is implied by appropriate versions of asymmetry: robustness and strictness. Theorem 2 shows that the evolutionary dynamics of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) are (robustly) asymmetric toward any (strictly) ordinal GR dominant pro…le. Blume (1993) studied an alternative evolutionary dynamics in which the cost of transition is linear in the di¤erence between the payo¤ from a given action and the best response payo¤. Theorem 3 shows that Blume's and related dynamics are (strictly) asymmetric toward any (strictly) cardinal GR dominant pro…le. Figure 2 presents logical connections between the results in the paper.
Recall that Ellison (1993) and Ellison (2000) establish the stochastic stability of pro…le a of risk-dominant actions in model (1.3), if the network has a particular shape like a circle or torus (see, for example, Lee, Szeidl, and Valentinyi (2003) or Blume and Temzelides (2003) for generalizations of Ellison's argument). The results from Figure 2 imply that a is stochastically stable on all networks, and uniquely so on networks that satisfy a simple condition on the number of players. Blume (1993) shows if the interaction game is symmetric and has two actions, then the pro…le of strictly risk-dominant actions is uniquely stochastically stable on a two-dimensional lattice. This is further in Young (1998) to all local interaction models (1.3)). Blume (1993) and Young (1998) rely on the fact that two-action symmetric coordination games have a potential function. Because of Figure 2 , the results from Blume (1993) and Young (1998) can be generalized to, among others, games with multiple actions and games without potential.
Since Rubinstein (1989) , Carlsson and Damme (1993) , and Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995) , it is known that risk-or, more generally, p-dominant outcomes are robust to incomplete information. It has been argued that the connection between the two models is not accidental. For example, Morris (2000) shows that the arguments behind evolutionary selection on some networks closely resemble contagion arguments used in the robustness to incomplete information literature. At this moment, it remains unknown whether a similar relationship such a de…nition is too strong. In particular, is a is risk-dominant, but not a best response when more than 3 5 neighbors plays b; then a is not multi-player risk-dominant. Figure 2 . Connections between the results of the paper exists between GR dominance and incomplete information games. The answer to this question would shed light on the connections between the two models. In particular, a negative answer would mean that the connection established in the previous literature is restricted to very special classes of games, such as games on networks with a speci…c network structure. A positive answer may lead to new results in the global games literature.
Asymmetric dynamics
This section identi…es an abstract property of evolutionary dynamics, asymmetry, that is responsible for the evolutionary selection results discussed later in the paper.
2.1. Model. There are I 2 players. Each player i chooses an action i from a …nite set A i : A state of the population is represented as an action pro…le 2 = i A i ; and i denotes the actions of all players but i:
We describe abstract evolutionary dynamics on the space state following Ellison (2000) . The state of the population evolves according to the Markov process P " , where P " ( ; 0 ) 0 denotes the probability of transition from to 0 and for each ; "; X 0 P " ( ; 0 ) = 1: The parameter " > 0 is interpreted as the probability of an individual mutation. We assume that limits
exist (note that they might be equal to 1). 
Pro…le is stochastically stable if lim "!0 " ( ) > 0: It is uniquely stochastically stable, if lim "!0 " ( ) = 1:
Pro…les ; are a associated if for all players i, either i = a i or i = a i : Pro…les and are almost a associated if they are a-associated or there is player j; such that either i = a i or i = a i for any player i 6 = j.
To parse these de…nitions, consider the binary case A i = f0; 1g and a i = 1 for each i: The set = i A i is a lattice with a natural partial order : Pro…le is a-dominated by ; are a-associated, there exists 0 such that is a-dominated by 0 , 0 is a-associated with 0 ; and
This de…nition has a simple intuition. Very informally, if the cost function is asymmetric, then for any transition away from pro…le a, there is an "associated" transition toward pro…le a with at most the same cost. The cost function drawn in Figure 3 is asymmetric. For example, notice that c (000; 100) = 4 5 = c (111; 011) :
Theorem 1 below states that if the cost function is asymmetric toward a, then pro…le a is stochastically stable. Unique stochastic stability requires additional conditions. Two variations of the above de…nition are useful. In what follows, we adopt the convention that 1 < 1: De…nition 2. Cost function c is strictly asymmetric toward a if
(1) for any 6 = a; c (a; ) > 0; and (2) for any pro…les ; 0 ; , such that and are a-associated, there exists 0 such that is a-dominated by 0 , 0 is a-associated with 0 ; and either c ( ;
Strict asymmetry is more restrictive than asymmetry. Strict asymmetry requires that inequality (2.2) is strict whenever c ( ; 0 ) > 0. Additionally, strict asymmetry requires that the transitions out of pro…le a are costly. We demonstrate below that the cost function from the dynamics by Blume (1993) is robustly asymmetric toward strictly cardinal GR dominant pro…les. The cost function from Figure 3 is strictly asymmetric. In fact, one cannot lower the cost of any transition downwards by 1 or more without violating the strict asymmetry. For example, if the cost of the transition from 111 to 011 changed from 5 to 4; this would violate the inequality c (000; 100) < c (111; 011). 
Robust asymmetry is more restrictive than asymmetry. We demonstrate below that the cost function from the dynamics by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) is robustly asymmetric toward strictly ordinal GR dominant pro…les.
The main theorem of this section characterizes stochastic stability under Markov dynamics with asymmetric cost functions. Theorem 1. If the cost function is asymmetric toward a, then a is stochastically stable. If it is strictly or robustly asymmetric toward a, then a is uniquely stochastically stable.
2.3. Proof of Theorem 1. The rest of this section discusses the proof of the Theorem. The reader interested in the applications of the above result should go directly to Sections 3 and 4. There are three steps in the proof of the Theorem.
The …rst step is standard. We rely on the well-known tree technique of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) . A tree h is a function h : ! with a distinguished element h 2 called a root of the tree, st. (a) h ( h ) = h and (b) for every 6 = h there is a path ; h ( ) ; :::; h m ( ) = h leading from to h . Let c : ! [0; 1] be a cost function. A cost of tree h is equal to the sum of the costs of its branches: c (h) = P 6 = h c ( ; h ( )) : A tree has minimal cost, if there is no tree with a lower cost. Denote the set of all roots of minimal cost trees as M R ( ; c) = f : is a root of a tree h st. for any h 0 ; c (h) c (h 0 )g :
It turns out that the stochastic stability of a pro…le is equivalent to whether this pro…le is a root of a minimal cost tree.
Lemma 1 (Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) 
The next Lemma is proven in Appendix A. It shows that the problem of …nding the roots of minimal cost trees on can be reduced to the analogous problem in the binary case.
Lemma 2. Suppose that cost function c :
is asymmetric (strictly asymmetric, robustly asymmetric). There exists a supermodular and asymmetric (strictly asymmetric, robustly asymmetric) cost function :
The central part of the proof is contained in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. If cost function
: S S ! [0; 1] is supermodular and asymmetric, then 1 2 M R (S; ) : Additionally, if it is strictly or robustly asymmetric, then f1g = M R (S; ) :
Lemma 3 identi…es su¢ cient conditions on the cost function which guarantee that state 1 is a (unique) root of minimal cost trees. Theorem 1 is a corollary to Lemmas 1, 2, and 3.
2.4. Intuition for Lemma 3. The proof of Lemma 3 can be found in Appendix B. Here, we use the example from Figure 3 to sketch the main ideas behind the Lemma.
All known algorithms for …nding the roots of minimal cost trees are based on a similar idea (Chu and Liu (1965) , Edmonds (1967) ). Instead of solving the problem (S; ) directly, one replaces it by a simpler problem using one of two techniques:
(1) Subtracting a constant. One can replace by 0 = ; where := min v6 =v 0 (v; v 0 ).
It is easy to see that this operation does not change the set of minimal cost trees, M R (S; ) = M R (S; 0 ) : The left graph in Figure 4 shows the cost function obtained from Figure 3 by subtracting 1.
(2) Merging. Consider the left graph in Figure 4 . Notice that the cost of transition from states 110 and 101 to 111 is equal to 0 and each transition out of state 111 has a cost of at least 3. Any tree with a root at one of the states 110 or 101 can be replaced by a tree with a root at 111 with a total cost lower by at least 3. Thus, states 110 and 101 cannot be roots of minimal trees. One can replace the problem (S; 0 )
from the left graph in Figure Clearly, the set of minimal tree roots is contained in the set of all attractors [
Moreover, if v is the minimal tree root, then any other attractor v 0 2 U (v) is also a minimal tree root. Lemma 16 shows that, if the cost function is supermodular, then for any state v; the set of attractors U (v) contains its highest element:
v 2 Sg to be the space of the highest elements in the attractor sets with the interpretation that each state v merges into state v (v) : If each attractor set contains only one element, then merging does not change the set of minimal tree roots. If there is an attractor set with more than two elements, some minimal tree roots might be lost. However, the merging guarantees that the new state space always contains at least some of the minimal tree roots of the original problem.
One can continue simplifying the problem by alternating between the two techniques. At each step, subtracting a constant creates 0-costs transitions and merging reduces the size of the state space. The algorithm stops when there is only one state remaining. Of course, the remaining state must be a root of the minimal cost tree. Figure 5 presents the subsequent steps of the algorithm in the example. In this example, one can check that no roots were lost along the steps of the procedure. Because 111 is the only remaining state, it is the unique minimal tree root in the original problem (S; ) :
The above discussion de…nes the algorithm. The proof of Lemma 3 shows that, if the initial cost function is supermodular and asymmetric, then state 1 survives all the steps of the algorithm; hence it is a minimal tree root of the initial problem. In addition, if the initial cost function is robustly or strictly asymmetric, then no other minimal tree roots are lost along the algorithm. The idea is based on the following observations: If the original cost function is supermodular and strictly or robustly asymmetric, then If the cost function at step k 1 of the algorithm is supermodular and (strictly) asymmetric, then it remains supermodular and (strictly) asymmetric also at step k + 1 (Lemmas 16 and 17): If the original cost function is supermodular and (strictly or robustly asymmetric), then step 1 and all the subsequent steps are supermodular and (strictly) asymmetric. Notice that the cost function from Figure 5 is strictly asymmetric at all steps. For example, consider the transition from state 001 to 000. State 111 is the unique state that is 1-associated with 001 in state space S 1 , and, 1 (001; 000) = 1 > 1 (111; 111) = 0 (the cost of the transition from a state to itself is always equal to 0 by de…nition). 
111
Step 1
Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 5 Figure 5 . Steps of the algorithm If step k is supermodular and asymmetric, then state 1 is not "merged" into any other state. More precisely, if
and, by the chosen convention of merging states into the upper most candidate, all states v such that k (v; 1) = 0 are merged into state 1: In particular, the only state remaining at the end of the algorithm is 1. Therefore, 1 is the only remaining state when the algorithm stops. In addition, if step k is strictly asymmetric, then there is no minimal tree root lost when merging other states into state 1: More precisely, if
Because this must be true along all the steps of the algorithm, not only 1 is the only remaining state when the algorithm stops, but also 1 is the unique minimal tree root of the initial problem.
Ordinal generalized risk-dominance
This section discusses the ordinal extension of risk-dominance to multi-player games.
3.1. De…nition. Let u i (x i ; i ) denote a payo¤ of player i from action x i given the pro…le of the opponents'actions i : To economize on subscripts, we sometimes write u i (x i ; ) = u i (x i ; i ). Action x i is a best response (strict best response) to pro…le if for any action
Pro…le a is strictly ordinal GR dominant, if for any player i; any action x i 2 A i ; x i 6 = a i ; any pro…les ; that are almost a-associated, a i is a strict best response to either or :
This de…nition says that if a i is not a best response of player i to certain pro…le ; then it becomes a best response if all players j who do not play a j in pro…le switch to a j ; and the other players switch to any action.
Suppose that there are two players, I = 2; and each player chooses one of two actions, jA i j = 2 for each i: In this case, any equilibrium pro…le is ordinal GR dominant. Indeed, suppose that a = (a 1 ; a 2 ) 2 A 1 A 2 is an equilibrium pro…le, i.e., for each player i; a i is a best response to a i : Let ; 0 2 A 1 A be two a-associated pro…les. Then, either i = a i or 0 i = a i and a i is a best response to one of the pro…les or 0 : On the other hand, pro…le a is strictly ordinal GR dominant if and only if a i is a best response to a i as well as to x i 6 = a i ; hence, if and only if a i is dominant.
3.2. Example: Local interactions. Let : A A ! R be a payo¤ function in a symmetric two-player interaction game. Following Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995) , say that a 2 A is (strictly) p-dominant in interaction game ; if it is a (strict) best response to any distribution 2 A that assigns probability of at least p to action a:
Consider the local interaction model with payo¤s u local i de…ned in (1.3). Ellison (1993) assumes that g ij = g ji 2 f0; 1g for each i and j: The next result is formulated for general weights g ij 0. Let a = (a; :::; a) 2 A I .
Lemma 4. If action a is 1 2
-dominant in two-player interaction game , then a is ordinal GR dominant. If action a is strictly 1 2 -dominant in interaction game , then a is strictly ordinal GR dominant. Here, = max i i is a characteristic of weights (g ij ) and i is de…ned as
Proof. We verify only the second statement. Suppose that a is strictly 1 2
-dominant in the interaction game. Take any two almost a-associated pro…les and and suppose that a is not a strict best response to : Then,
Because pro…les and are almost a-associated, there is player j 6 = i; such that
where the last inequality follows from the de…nition of : Hence, a is a strict best response to pro…le :
There are two important applications. In the global interaction model of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) with uniform matching g uniform ij = 1 for each i and j. It is easy to check that
Thus, Lemma 4 implies that (a) if a is risk-dominant in the interaction game, then pro…le a is ordinal GR dominant in the multiplier game u uniform ; and (b) if a is strictly risk-dominant in the interaction game, then pro…le a is strictly ordinal GR dominant in the multiplier game u uniform if either the number of players is odd or the number of players is even and su¢ ciently large.
In the games on a network of Ellison (1993) -dominant in the interaction game.
3.3. KMR dynamics. Consider the evolutionary learning process based on Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) . Each period player i is randomly drawn (say with a probability 1 N ) and given an opportunity to change his action. With a probability of order 1 "; she chooses one of the best responses to the current pro…le in the population; with a probability of order "; she chooses an action randomly. Formally, assume that the dynamics is a Markov process with a cost function c KM R : Theorem 2. If a is ordinal GR dominant, then it is stochastically stable under dynamics c KM R . If a is strictly ordinal GR dominant, then it is uniquely stochastically stable under dynamics c KM R .
Proof. We show that if pro…le a is ordinal GR dominant (strictly ordinal GR dominant), then cost function c KM R is asymmetric (robustly asymmetric) toward a. The result will follow from Theorem 1. The proof proceeds in four steps. First, take any pro…les ; 0 ; such that ; are aassociated (almost a-associated). We show that there is a pro…le 0 ; such that 0 and 0 are a-associated (almost a-associated) and c KM R ( ;
c KM R ( ; 0 ) = 0 (the other cases are trivial). Let j and x j be a player and an action, such that 0 j = x j 6 = j : Hence, x j is a best response of player j to pro…le : Consider two cases: If x j 6 = a j ; then, by ordinal GR dominance, a j is a best response of player j to : Let 0 be such that This shows that if a is ordinal GR dominant, then cost function c KM R is asymmetric. This also shows that if a is strictly ordinal GR dominant, then part 2 of the de…nition of robustly asymmetric cost function (De…nition 3) is satis…ed.
Second, notice that if a is strictly ordinal GR dominant, then it is a strict Nash equilibrium. Thus, for any 2 ; c KM R (a; ) > 0 and part 1 of De…nition 3 holds.
Third, take any pro…les ;
(the case c KM R ( ; 0 ) = 1 is trivial). Let be a pro…le such that and are a-associated and take 0 := : Then, c KM R ( ; 0 ) = 0 and 0 is almost a-associated with 0 (the latter is a consequence of the fact that there is a player j such that such that j 6 = a j and j 6 = a j . Because of (b), a j is not a best response to j . Because a is ordinal GR dominant, a j is a strict best response to i : Let 0 be a pro…le such that The dynamics c KM R di¤er from Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) who allow for multiple adjustments in each period. In that version, each period, each player is activated with probability p 2 (0; 1) : Once activated, with a probability of order 1 "; she chooses one of the best responses to the current pro…le in the population; with a probability of order "; she chooses an action randomly. The cost function of these dynamics can be de…ned as -dominant in interaction game , then a is stochastically stable under dynamics c KM R . Additionally, if the network satis…es condition (3.1), then a is uniquely stochastically stable under dynamics c KM R .
The Corollary extends the results by Ellison (1993) and Ellison (2000) to all networks. The role of condition (3.1) is to avoid integer problems that appear when the number of players is small. To see this, consider two examples. The …rst example comes from Jackson and Watts (2002) .
Example 1 (Star). Suppose that A = fa; bg and is a payo¤ in a coordination game with two pure strategy equilibria (a; a) and (b; b) : Consider a network with a central player connected to all other players and none of the other players are connected to each other. Then ,both the equilibrium pro…les are stochastically stable. To see this, observe that one needs exactly one mistake by the central player to switch between coordinating on one of two actions.
Example 2. Suppose that A = fa; bg ; action a is a best response to any pro…le with at least 40% players playing a, and action b is a best response to any pro…le with at least 60% playing b: Suppose that there are n players, all connected to each other. If n = 4; then the number of neighbors of each player is odd, and it takes exactly two mutations to move the process out of the respective basins of attraction. Hence, both pro…les a and b are stochastically stable. If there are n = 3 or n = 5 players, then the number of neighbors of each player is even. If one (in case n = 3) or two (in case n = 5) players change their actions to a; then a becomes a strict best response for the remaining players. On the other hand, starting from pro…le a; one needs two (in case n = 3) or three (in case n = 5) players to change their actions to make b a best response for the remaining players. Hence, with n = 3; 5; only a is stochastically stable.
Cardinal generalized risk-dominance
4.1. De…nition. This section presents a cardinal generalization of risk-dominance.
Pro…le a is strictly cardinal GR dominant if for any player i; any pro…les ; that are a-associated,
This says that for any player i; any pair of a-associated pro…les ; ; the di¤erence between the payo¤ from any action x i 6 = a i and the payo¤ from a i against pro…le is smaller than the di¤erence between the payo¤ from a i and any other action x i 6 = a i against pro…le .
Clearly, cardinal GR dominance implies ordinal GR dominance. However, strict cardinal GR dominance does not necessarily imply strict ordinal GR dominance.
4.2.
For each pro…le ; denote as the pro…le with all actions ‡ipped: i = a i i¤ ( ) i = b i : Conjecture 2 ( i A i ) about action pro…les is symmetric with respect to labels if for each ; ( ) = ( ) :
Lemma 5. If payo¤s are complementary, then a i is player i's (strict) best response to any symmetric conjecture for each player i if and only if a is (strictly) cardinal GR dominant.
Proof. Suppose that a i is player i's (strict) best response to any symmetric conjecture for each player i. Take any a-associated pair of pro…les and : Consider a symmetric conjecture that assigns probability
to pro…le (and probability 1 2 to pro…le ). Then,
Observe that a-dominates : By complementarity,
The inequalities imply that a is (strictly) cardinal GR dominant. Suppose that a is (strictly) cardinal GR dominant. Take any symmetric conjecture and notice that it is equal to convex combinations of symmetric conjectures that assign positive probability to only two states, = P where a 0; P = 1 and ( ) = ( ) = : By (strict) cardinal GR dominance,
4.3. Cardinal GR dominance and 1 2 -dominance. With two players and two actions, (strict) cardinal GR dominance is equivalent to Harsanyi and Selten (1988) -dominance. For multi-player games, Morris, Rob, and Shin (1995) de…nes a (p 1 ; :::; p I )-dominant equilibrium, in which the action of player i is the best response to any conjecture that assigns a probability of at least p i to the equilibrium action pro…le. If there are only two actions for each player and complementarities, then cardinal GR dominance implies 1 2 ; :::; 1 2 -dominance. This follows from Lemma 5 and the fact that a conjecture according to which each player randomizes equally between the two actions is symmetric.
In general, there is no further logical relationship between GR dominance and -dominance in the two-player interaction game and cardinal GR dominance with local interactions.
Example: Local interactions.
Consider the local interaction model described in section 3.2. Let : A A ! R be a symmetric payo¤ in a two-player interaction. Fix a 2 A and let a = (a; :::; a) : Say that action a 2 A is (strictly) strongly -dominant in the interaction game , then a is strictly cardinal GR dominant.
Proof. We verify only the second statement. Suppose that a is strictly strongly 1 2 -dominant in the interaction game. Take any pair of a-associated pro…les ; and …x player i. De…ne distribution 2 A: for any x 2 A
6 Note that, if pro…le (a i ; a j ) is an equilibrium in a two-player, two-action game, then the payo¤s are complementary.
Then, (a) 1 2
: By strict strong 1 2 -dominance,
Thus, a is strictly cardinal GR dominant.
4.5. Payo¤-based dynamics. Let f : [0; 1) ! [0; 1) be a strictly increasing function such that f (0) = 0: De…ne cost function c f : for any pro…les ;
if there is player j, such that i = 0 i for all i 6 = j; then
otherwise, c f ( ; 0 ) = 1.
These dynamics relates the cost of a transition toward x j to the di¤erence between best response payo¤ and the payo¤ from x j . By assumption, the cost of a transition is increasing in the di¤erence between payo¤s. For example, if the cost of a transition is linear in the di¤erence between payo¤s, f (c) = c; for some > 0; then c f is a cost function of Blume (1993) . (If f is increasing rather than strictly increasing and f (c) = 1 fc 0g ; then c f = c KM R .) Theorem 3. If a is cardinal GR dominant, then it is stochastically stable under dynamics c f . If a is strictly cardinal GR dominant, then it is uniquely stochastically stable under dynamics c f .
Proof. We show that if pro…le a is cardinal GR dominant (strictly cardinal GR dominant), then cost function c f is asymmetric (strictly asymmetric). The result will follow from Theorem 1.
Take any pro…les ; 0 ; , such that ; are a-associated. We show that there exists 0 such that is a-dominated by 0 , 0 and 0 are a-associated and either c f ( ; 0 ) = 0 or c f ( ; 0 ) < c ( ; 0 ) : Assume that there is a player j, such that i = 0 i for all i 6 = j (the other case is trivial because of convention that 1 < 1). Let x j = 0 j . There are a few cases to be considered.
If x j = a j or ( j 6 = a j and x j 6 = a j ), then let 0 := : Pro…les 0 and 0 are a-associated, and, by de…nition, c f (
If x j 6 = a j , j = a j and there is x 0 j 6 = a j which is a best response to ; then, by cardinal GR dominance, a j is a best response to : Take 0 such that 0 j = j and 0 j = a j . Then, is a-dominated by 0 and pro…les 0 ; 0 are a-associated. Because a j is a best response to ; c f ( ; 0 ) = 0 c f ( ; 0 ).
If x j 6 = a j , j = a j and a j is a strict best response to ; then
Take 0 such that 0 j = j and 0 j = a j . Then, is a-dominated by 0 and pro…les 0 ; 0 are a-associated. By (strict) cardinal GR dominance,
which implies that
This shows that if a is cardinal GR dominant, then c f is asymmetric and it also shows that strict cardinal GR dominance implies part 2 of the de…nition of strictly asymmetric cost function (De…nition 2).
Finally, if a is strictly cardinal GR dominant, then for any 2 ; c f (a; ) > 0: This is because a i is a strict best response to pro…le a (note that a is a-associated with a). Thus, part 1 of De…nition 2 holds, and c f is strictly asymmetric.
It is instructive to compare Theorems 2 and 3. Under c KM R , the probability of a player switching between two actions depends only on whether these actions are myopic best responses. That, in turn, depends only on the ordinal properties of the payo¤ function. It is not surprising that these dynamics select an equilibrium that satis…es certain ordinal properties. In contrast, the dynamics of Blume (1993) , or, more generally, dynamics c f ; depend on the cardinal di¤erences between payo¤s from various actions. Thus, such dynamics should select an equilibrium that satis…es certain cardinal properties. This intuition is con…rmed by two Theorems.
Corollary 2. If a is strongly -dominant) in the interaction game , then a is stochastically stable (uniquely stochastically stable) under dynamics c f .
The Corollary extends the results by Blume (1993) and Young (1998) 
, there exists a sequence " n ! 0 such that limits
exist (Lemma 11), is supermodular and, if c is (robustly, strictly) asymmetric toward a, then is (robustly, strictly) asymmetric toward 1 (Lemmas 9 and 10).
Assume that cost function c is (robustly, strictly) asymmetric toward a. Then,
The …rst implication is a consequence of (A.1) and the proof of Lemma 1 (indeed, the proof of Lemma 1 implies that lim n!1 q "n (1) lim n!1 "
; where h 1 is a minimal cost tree with its root at 1); the second one follows from the fact that q 
Let S be the space of probability distributions on S: For distributions ; 0 2 S say that 0 if for each upper E S; (E) 0 (E) : For any distribution 2 S; any Markov
process on S is a mapping Q : S ! S: For any two Markov processes Q; Q 0 : S ! S; 
A.2. Auxiliary family Q 0 . Write P " ( ; E) = X 0 2F
P " ( ; 0 ) for any subset F and any pro…le : Let : ! S be a mapping such that for any pro…le 2 ; ( ( )) i = 1 if and only if i = a i : For any v; v 0 2 S; de…ne 
and, if c is (strictly, robustly) asymmetric toward a, then 0 is (strictly, robustly) asymmetric toward 1.
Proof. Find subsequence of " n such that for each v;there exists v so that
and limits
exist for each v and v 0 : Notice that for each v 2 S; 0 lim sup
(Strict, robust) asymmetry of 0 is implied by (strict, robust) asymmetry of c and inequalities (A.3). We show that the asymmetry asymmetry of cost function c implies the asymmetry of cost function 0 : Take any v; v 0 , and v such that v and v are 1-associated.
: Then, and are aassociated. By asymmetry of c; there exists 0 that a-dominates , 0 and 0 are a-associated, and c ( ;
The same argument (with "associated" replaced by "almost associated") implies that if c is robustly asymmetric then part 2 of De…nition 3 holds for .
suppose that condition (1) of de…nitions of strict and robust asymmetry holds for cost function c: Then, because 1 (1) = fag ; for any v < 1;
and condition (1) holds also for cost function 0 :
Suppose that c is strictly asymmetric. Take any v; v 0 ; v, such that v; v are 1-associated
Then, and are a-associated. By strict asymmetry of c; there exists 0 that a-dominates , 0 and 0 are a-associated, and c ( ;
Suppose that c is robustly asymmetric. A similar argument to the one given above shows that condition (3) of De…nition 3 holds for 0 : We will show that condition (4) of De…nition 3 holds for 0 : Take v,v 0 ; and v such that v 0 is almost 1-dominated by v and v is 1-associated
By robust asymmetry of c; for each 2 1 ( v) ; there is 0 that is a-associated with ; is a-dominated by 0 ; and c ( ; 0 ) = 0: Thus,
and 0 is robustly asymmetric.
A.3. Cost function . We de…ne cost function : S S ! R on state space S : 
Hence, is supermodular.
Lemma 10. If c is (strictly, robustly) asymmetric toward a, then is (strictly, robustly) asymmetric toward 1.
Proof. Assume that c is asymmetric toward a: By Lemma 8, 0 is asymmetric toward 1. 
and 0 is asymmetric toward 1.
Suppose that c is either strictly (or robustly) asymmetric. Then, by Lemma 8 0 (1; v) > 0 for any v 6 = 1: This implies that (1; v) > 0 for any v 6 = 1 and part 1 of De…nition 2 (or De…nition 3) holds for : Suppose that c is strictly asymmetric. Take any v; v 0 ; v, such that v; v are 1-associated 
and 0 is strictly asymmetric toward 1.
Suppose that c is robustly asymmetric. A similar argument to the one given above shows that condition (3) of De…nition 3 holds for : We will show that part 4 of De…nition 3 holds and de…ne auxiliary process Q "n :
and
It is easy to check that Q "n is ergodic, the stationary distribution of Q "n is equal to q "n = q
A.5. Auxiliary family Q. We construct Markov processes Q "n (v) so that (A.1) holds, Q "n is monotonic, and Q "n Q "n : Fix < 1 2jSj and let (v) = #fi:v i =1g and de…ne
It is easy to check that the ergodicity of Q 0 "n implies ergodicity of Q "n (v). Let q "n be the stationary distribution of Q en Lemma 11. (A.1) holds.
where the second to last equality follows from the fact that limits (A.2) exist. If v > v 0 ;
In all the other cases, the result is trivial.
Lemma 12. Q "n is monotonic.
Proof. It is enough to show that Q U "n and Q D "n are monotonic. First, we show that Q U "n is monotonic. Take any upper E S and v
where the second equality comes from the fact that for eachṽ
; the third inequality comes from the fact that if v 0 2 E and E is upper, then v 0 _ v 1 2 E and that there is at most jSj elements in set E; and the fourth inequality follows from jSj 1 and # fi :
The last inequality follows from the fact that ifṽ
2 E; and because v 0 2 E; ifṽ 0^v1 = 2 E; then it cannot be thatṽ 0 v 0 :
Proof. It is enough to show that Q
. First, we show that for any upper E; any v 2 S; Q
where the last inequality follows from jSj 1 and the fact that set E cannot contain more than jSj elements. Next, we show that for any upper E; any v 2 S; Q
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 7, 12, and 13.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3
The algorithm of …nding minimal tree roots is de…ned as a
(1) sequence of sets,
sequence of costs functions
Below, we describe how to choose sets, cost functions and projections in a way that allows to recover M R V k ; k from M R V k+1 ; k+1 . Next, we discuss how to trace properties of cost functions k along steps k. Finally, we use these properties to prove Lemma 3. 
If the sequence of projections satis…es the assumption of the Lemma, then formula (B.2) leads to a simple procedure of recovering
Proof. This result is standard and it is satis…ed by most known algorithms (Chu and Liu (1965) , Edmonds (1967) ; Proposition 1 of Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) and the Appendix in Young (1993) contain a version of the Lemma for k = 1). We present the proof for the sake of completeness. Let
(1) For any k
Suppose that h is a tree with a root that is not a k-attractor,
There is also a 0-cost path from v h to v : One can modify h into a new tree h with the root at v , where the only changes are those that are necessary to connect v h to v via the 0-cost path. The cost of tree h is lower than the cost of h by (v ; h (v )) :
(2) For any tree h on V k ; k with the root at v h ; there is a tree h on V k+1 ;~ k+1 with at most the same cost and a root at
This is a consequence of the de…nition of~ k+1 .
(3) For any tree h on
with a root at v h ; for any v h 2 U k (v h ) ; there is a tree h on V k ; k with at most the same cost and the root at v h : Indeed, let n : 1; :::; V k+1 1 ! V k+1 n fv h g be an enumeration of set V k+1 n fv h g with the property that if a path from v to v h passes through v 0 ; then n 1 (v) < n 1 (v 0 ) : By induction on n; we can construct a sequence of functions h (n) :
where
and such that for each v 2 H (n) ; there is a unique path along h to some
and X
Indeed, let h (0) consist of 0-cost paths which connect each v = 2 V k+1 with j k+1 (v) and then inductively modify h (m 1) to h (m) by adding lowest cost path (on V k ) between n (m 1) to n (m). This gives a tree h 0 = h (jV k+1 j 1) on V k with a cost at most equal to the cost of tree h and with a root at some v 0 2 U k (v h ) : Such a tree can be easily modi…ed to a tree with exactly the same cost and the root at v h 2 U k (v h ) :
(4) By (2) and (3), the cost of minimal cost tree in problem V k ; k is equal to the cost of the minimal cost tree in problem V k ;~ k : Let us denote the cost as c
k is equal to the set of all elements of V k that are roots of trees with k -cost c min ; similarly, M R V k+1 ;~ k+1 is equal to the set of all elements of V k+1 that are roots of trees with~ k+1 -cost c min : 
Step k of the algorithm is supermodular if
v; v 0 g as the joint of v and v 0 (i.e., for each
The next result guarantees that supermodularity is inherited along the sequence of steps.
i.e., set U k (v) contains its largest element. De…ne
Then, step k + 1 is supermodular.
Proof. Suppose that u; u 0 2 V k are k-attractors that are connected by a 0-cost path in V k : 
Next, take v; v 0 ; v 2 V k+1 st. v v; and suppose that v = v 0 ; :::; v s 2 V k is the minimal cost path from v to v 0 = v s :
The same argument as above leads to the existence of a path v = v 
Because v a s v; v t ; by the …rst part of this proof,
Because J 0 = id S ; if cost function 0 = is supermodular, then step 0 is supermodular.
By induction on k; de…ne j k+1 (v) as in (B.4). Then, the Lemma implies that each step k is supermodular.
B.3. Tracing the algorithm -asymmetry.
Step k is asymmetric 
The next lemma guarantees that the asymmetry is inherited along the sequence of steps:
Lemma 17. Suppose that step k is supermodular and j k+1 is de…ned by (B.4). If step k is asymmetric (strictly asymmetric), then step k + 1 is asymmetric (strictly asymmetric).
Proof. Suppose that v; v 2 S are 1-associated. In two steps, we show that
are 1-associated. First, observe that by the asymmetry of kth step,
Inductively construct a path Because J 0 = id S ; if cost function 0 = is asymmetric, then step 0 is asymmetric. The
Lemma implies that each step k is asymmetric. The next Lemma shows that if the cost function is strictly or robustly asymmetric, then step 1 is strictly asymmetric.
Lemma 18. Suppose that step 0 is supermodular and j 1 is de…ned by (B.4). If cost function is strictly or robustly asymmetric, then step 1 is strictly asymmetric. 
Suppose now that the cost function is, in addition, strictly or robustly asymmetric. Then, (1; v 0 ) > 0 for any v 0 6 = 1: Thus, f1g = U 0 (1) :
We show by induction on k that f1g = U k (1) : Assume that f1g = U k 1 (1) for k 1: By the remarks after Lemma 18, step k is strictly asymmetric. Suppose that k (1; v 0 ) = 0 for some v 0 2 V k : By strict asymmetry of step k, k J k ( v) ; v 0 < 0 for some v 0 2 V k : A contradiction shows that k (1; v 0 ) > 0 for any v 0 2 V k and f1g = U U k 1 (1) = U k (1). 
